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existing cable monopolies which are still
largely unregulated. However, they remain concerned about possible telephone
cross-subsidization of cable operations
from monopoly loop revenues. One monopoly may end up merely replacing another, except once cable is precluded and
its lines are removed, there may be a more
absolute monopoly free from the prospect
of potential competition from another existing loop. This concern does not lead to
exclusion of telephone company entry
into cable markets, because it does little
good to have a potential competitor who
is categorically precluded from competing. But it does indicate a strong public
interest in regulating telephone entry to
preserve continuing competition.
In Assembly of the State of California v.
Public Utilities Commission, No. S044844,
Assembly Speaker Willie Brown has petitioned the California Supreme Court to review the PUC's disposition of a $49 million
fund established to compensate Pacific Bell
ratepayers for cross-subsidizing Pacific Telesis' development of its wireless operation,
which it recently spun off as a new company
called "AirTouch." In August 1994, the PUC
decided that $7.9 million should be allocated
to PacBell ratepayers through a surcredit on
monthly bills; $40 million should be used for
telecommunications programs and facilities
in public schools statewide; and $2.1 million
should be used to continue the PUC's Telecommunications Education Trust. [14:4
CRLR 201-02] Speaker Brown argues that
all of the money should be refunded to ratepayers, or it should revert to the state general
fund. At this writing, the Supreme Court has
not decided whether to review the PUC's
decision.
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he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified

in the California Constitution at Article
VI, section 9. The State Bar was established as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the
State Bar has over 145,000 members, which
equals approximately 17% of the nation's
population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the Presidentare elected to the Board by lawyers in nine
geographic districts. A representative of the
California Young Lawyers Association
(CYLA), appointed by that organization's
Board of Directors, also sits on the Board.
The six public members are variously selected by the Governor, Assembly Speaker,
and Senate Rules Committee, and confirmed by the state Senate. Each Board
member serves a three-year term, except for
the CYLA representative (who serves for
one year) and the Board President (who
serves a fourth year when elected to the
presidency). The terms are staggered to provide for the selection of five attorneys and
two public members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 245 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (I) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct, which
are codified at section 6076 of the Business and Professions Code, and promoting
competence-based education; (3) ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) improving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attorney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The

Bar recommends sanctions to the California Supreme Court, which makes final
discipline decisions. However, Business
and Professions Code section 6007 authorizes the Bar to place attorneys on invol-

untary inactive status if they pose a substantial threat of harm to clients or to the
public, among other reasons.

PROJECTS
*MAJOR
Bar Analyzes Recommendations of
Discipline Evaluation Committee. In
August 1994, the "blue-ribbon" Discipline Evaluation Committee (DEC) chaired
by retired U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Arthur L. Alarc6n released a
report of its eight-month evaluation of the
State Bar's disciplinary system. Established in December 1993 by then-Bar
President Margaret Morrow to conduct the
first external review of the Bar's restructured discipline system, the DEC was to
thoroughly evaluate the structure, cost, effectiveness, and fairness of all components of the Bar's system-including its
Intake/Legal Advice Unit, Office of Investigations (01), Office of the Chief Trial
Counsel (OCTC), State Bar Court (SBC),
and Complainants' Grievance Panel (CGP).
While the DEC's final report contained
high praise for the quality and quantity of
adjudicative decisionmaking by the new
State Bar Court, it nonetheless contained
52 recommendations on a wide spectrum
of issues-including several which have
caused controversy within the Bar. A
major theme of the DEC report is that the
Bar, particularly the State Bar Court, has
devoted excessive resources to upper
management and supervisory positions,
while other components have been underresourced. [14:4 CRLR 209-10]
In September, new Bar President Donald Fischbach appointed Discipline Committee Chair James Towery to head the
Task Force on Implementation of the DEC
Report, and directed the Task Force to
commence an initial analysis of the DEC
report and recommend a procedure whereby
the Discipline Committee and full Board
could take action on those recommendations as appropriate. Fischbach instructed
the Task Force to present its initial analysis at the Bar's October meeting.
Following two public hearings during
September, the Task Force presented its
analysis to the Board at its October 30
meeting. The Task Force categorized the
recommendations in the DEC report as
follows:
- Recommendations that are already
implemented or in place: With regard to
the State Bar Court, the Task Force noted
that the Bar already reduced the time of
two of its three Review Departmentjudges
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by 40% effective September 1, has not
included the authorized seventh Hearing
Department judge in its 1995-96 budget,
and has not included funding for pro tem
hearing judges in that budget. The Task
Force also observed that the Bar listed its
toll-free complaint number as a "consumer affairs" number in telephone directories in 1991.
- Recommendations whose implementation is in process: Among other things,
the Bar has already commenced the rulemaking process to establish permanent
disbarment for egregious misconduct (see
below); approved a voice mail system
which will also reduce the busy rate on the
discipline system's toll-free complaint
hotline number; the SBC Executive Committee is planning to adopt standards for
publication of its opinions and publish
more selectively; and the Bar may sponsor
statutory amendments to permit respondents to consent to discipline without admitting to culpability.
- Recommendations that can be implemented in the last quarter of 1994 or
the first quarter of 1995: In this category,
the Bar has commenced the rulemaking
process to establish a five-year statute of
limitations on the initiation of Bar disciplinary proceedings (see below); it is computerizing its discipline system forms to
eliminate duplication of effort; and it will
include information on the attorney discipline process in Bar public education
programs.
- Recommendations which require
study: The Task Force recommended, and
the Board approved, that the bulk of the
DEC recommendations be referred to the
Board's Discipline Committee for further
study. Among others, these include the
following issues:
-whether the overall management of
the discipline system should be delegated
to the Bar's Executive Director, and whether
reducing the costs of the discipline system
should be a priority of senior management;
-expansion of summary disbarment
for conviction of a felony or other crime
involving moral turpitude;
-revision of the Bar's standards to increase sanctions for misconduct involving
multiple clients, and to preclude substance
abuse from being asserted as a mitigating
factor;
-whether to publish the name of the
respondent's law firm when publicizing
the discipline of an attorney;
-whether to require disciplined attorneys to attend ethics school or other training programs (such as trust account management or client relations), and whether
to require one hour in discipline and client

relations as part of the Bar's minimum
continuing legal education requirement;
-replacement of the Complainants'
Grievance Panel with an Office of Consumer Advocate;
-restructuring of the OCTC's prosecution unit;
-development of a procedure to review
and address situations involving multiple
complaints against an attorney which do
not result in discipline;
-elimination of the separate Office of
Investigations and of the deputy director
positions within 01;
-reduction of support staff in the SBC
and reduction in the number of hearing
judges from six to four; and
-the implementation of staggered terms
for SBC judges.
Also at the Bar's October meeting, Task
Force/Discipline Committee chair James
Towery announced. the appointment of two
subcommittees-the Subcommittee on the
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel and the
Complainants' Grievance Panel (OCTC/CGP)
and the Subcommittee on the State Bar
Court-to further study and analyze the
DEC recommendations.
Prior to the Bar's December meeting,
the OCTC/CGP Subcommittee isolated the
core OCTC issues upon which the DEC
focused and condensed them into a set of
directives to the Chief Trial Counsel. The
consensus was to direct the Chief Trial
Counsel to develop models for the internal
structure of the OCTC based on several
identified "policy principles," such as systemwide teamwork and coordination
among the components of OCTC, increased attorney supervision of investigations, prioritization and expedited processing of complaints, and identification
and removal of structural impediments to
cost efficiencies and public protection.
Interestingly, the Subcommittee focused
on the Bar's "backlog statute" (Business
and Professions Code section 6140.2) as
"a major impediment to the discipline system operating in a cost-effective manner."
The statute requires the Bar to investigate
and dispose of complaints (either by way
of dismissal, sanction, or referral for prosecution) within six months of receipt; a
twelve-month period is allowed for cases
classified as "complex." According to the
Subcommittee, "the backlog statute has
led to a discipline system in which the
highest priority has become keeping as
low as possible the number of backlog
cases reported annually to the legislature ....As a result, resources are allocated
primarily based on the age of the complaint, ratherthan on the seriousness of the
alleged misconduct, or upon the imminent
threat to the public which the respondent
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may pose. This has had the further negative consequence that the discipline system is 'complaint-driven,' that is, the system responds reactively to client complaints, rather than focussing proactively
on more serious cases." The Subcommittee also opined that the Bar's annual reports of backlog status have created a false
and misleading indicator of the Bar's performance. "In reality, these annual reports
do nothing more than assess the success of
the State Bar in investigating cases based
upon the age of the complaint. The reports
fail to assess the more critical issue of how
well the system serves its mission in protecting the public." The Subcommittee
recommended that the Chief Trial Counsel
explore either deleting the backlog statute
in its entirety or amending it (which will
require legislation), and to explore alternative "and more meaningful" performance measurements for the discipline
system.
Over the strong objections of the public members of the Complainants' Grievance Panel, the OCTC/CGP Subcommittee also voted unanimously on December
6 to recommend to the Discipline Ccmmittee that the CGP be abolished on December 31, 1995. CGP reviews closed complaints at the request of the complainant,
and is authorized to request that 01 reopen
and reinvestigate a closed case; it also
audits the performance of the Bar's discipline system through a random review
of investigative files. In 1993, it requested
reinvestigation in 33% of the cases it reviewed at the request of complainants, and
requested reinvestigation in 16% of the
cases it audited. [14:2&3 CRLR 224; 13:4
CRLR 214-15] The Subcommittee focused
on the cost of the panel ($840,000 annually) and generally agreed that the CGP's
appeals process could be better handled
through a new department reporting directly to the Bar's Chief Trial Counsel.
Although several Subcommittee members
were upset that they were being required
to vote on the future of the CGP without a
concrete proposal for its replacement from
staff, Task Force Chair Towery promised
that Chief Trial Counsel Judy Johnson
would present a comprehensive proposal
to the Discipline Committee at its January
20 meeting.
At its December 9 meeting, the Discipline Committee approved the timetable
and policy principles established by the
OCTC/CGP Subcommittee; it did not vote
on the issue of CGP elimination. With the
goal of presenting its response to the DEC
recommendations to the full Board in
March 1995, the Subcommittee-working with the Executive Director and the
Chief Trial Counsel-is scheduled to re17
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turn to the Discipline Committee at its
January meeting with organizational models for OCTC and descriptions of pilot
programs to test the models. Thereafter,
these models will be sent for informal
comment to interested entities and persons, and returned to the Discipline Committee in March.
At this writing, the Subcommittee on
the State Bar Court is scheduled to begin
work on implementing the DEC's recommendations in January. Its task does not
promise to be easy. In November, the State
Bar Court presented a detailed response to
the DEC's findings that the SBC is "not
cost-effective." SBC noted that the DEC
failed to acknowledge that the court has
underspent its annual budget by at least
11% per year since 1991, and failed to
analyze any of the cost implications of its
recommendations that the number of SBC
judges and support staff be reduced. For
example, SBC argued that implementing
the DEC's recommendation that two of the
court's six hearing judges be eliminated
"would cripple the State Bar Court while
only saving the membership about $2 of
the $478 annual Bar dues (less than 1/2 of
1%)." SBC also noted that although it
currently has five fewer staff members
than it did in 1989, it now processes 2.5
times as many cases per year.
With regard to several faults in the case
processing and decisionmaking practices
of the State Bar Court identified by the
DEC, SBC disagreed with what it characterized as "three key assumptions of DEC...:
(1)that findings of fact and conclusions of
law historically have not been mandated in
Hearing Department decisions and are not
currently mandated; (2) that de novo review
by the Review Department has not historically been mandated and is not currently
mandated; and (3) that the firestorm of pending complaints in 1985 has been permanently eliminated and 'entirely different circumstances... now prevail."' SBC also
strongly disagreed with the DEC's recommendation that the discipline system revert
to management by a single individual
charged with carrying out the policies of the
Board of Governors; according to SBC,
"[t]his recommendation is contrary to the
dictates of the key 1988 reforms ensuring
separation of powers and judicial independence so strongly recommended by...State
Bar Monitor [Robert C. Fellmeth and]...is
also contrary to the ABA McKay Commission's recommendations for reducing the
role of elected bar officials nationwide and
for strengthening the independence of
each state's disciplinary officials which
the New Jersey Supreme Court used as a
basis for restructuring its system in the
summer of 1994. In sum, DEC was seri174
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ously mistaken in a number of its major
assumptions. DEC's recommendations do
not recognize either the full extent of the
court's existing workload or the likely future workload of the court. Adoption of
DEC's sweeping recommendations would
seriously undermine the current ability of
the State Bar Court to perform the vital
functions which the Supreme Court has to
date successfully entrusted to it and would
jeopardize not only the 1988 reforms, but
also the credibility of the entire discipline
system with the public."
Reappointment Process for State Bar
Court Judges. SB 1498 (Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988) created the
State Bar Court, the nation's first full-time
professional attorney disciplinary court.
The SBC currently consists of six hearing
judges (any one of whom may preside
over a particular discipline case) and a
three-judge Review Department (one of
whom must be a non-attorney) which issues the final agency decision in State Bar
discipline cases. Under Business and Professions Code section 6079.1, the Board
of Governors is permitted to screen and
rate all applicants for appointment or reappointment as a State Bar Court judge
and submit at least three nominations for
each vacancy to the Supreme Court "unless otherwise directed by the Supreme
Court." The Supreme Court appoints SBC
judges, and they serve for six-year terms.
The fact that the initial terms of four of the
six incumbent Hearing Departmentjudges
and the three incumbent Review Department judges expire on June 30, 1995 recently triggered a struggle within the Bar
between the Board of Governors (which
wants to retain as much input and control
over the judicial appointment process as
possible) and the State Bar Court (which
fears excessive interference in judicial appointments by the Board, because the
Board appoints the Chief Trial Counsel
and oversees the Bar's prosecutorial office, and may favor judges who rule in
favor of the prosecution).
At its August 1994 meeting, upon the
recommendation of its Discipline Committee, the Board of Governors approved
proposed amendments to Rule 961, California Rules of Court, regarding the procedure for the reappointment of State Bar
Court judges. Under the Bar's proposal, a
seven-member special committee appointed by the President of the Board of
Governors (which could not include a current member of the Board's Discipline
Committee) would review and evaluate
the reappointment applications of incumbent judges, and submit a confidential report and recommendations to the Supreme
Court; the special committee would notify

any incumbent judge if he/she has not
been recommended for reappointment. At
the same meeting, the Board voted to release the proposed amendments for a 45day public comment period ending on October 11, transfer the proposal to the California Supreme Court, and designate the
Discipline Committee as its agent to review and respond to the public comments
received, and transmit the comments and
any modifications it wishes to the Supreme Court by October 14. [14:4 CRLR
210-11]
During the comment period, two com-,
ments were received. One was from State
Bar Court Review Department Judge Ken
Norian, the court's only non-attorney, who
suggested that the Bar nominate candidates to sit on the special committee; the
Supreme Court would actually choose the
members of the special committee, and
would have the discretion to choose members not nominated by the Bar. Judge Norian also suggested that the Bar nominate
former members of the Board of Governors to the special committee, rather than
current members.
The other comment was from SBC Presiding Judge Lise Pearlman, who commended the Bar for eliminating the potential
conflict of interest by not allowing a current
member of the Discipline Committee to sit
on the proposed special committee. However, she expressed continued concern over
"the Board's insistence on the appointment
of the seven-member special committee by
the President of the State Bar..... Judge
Pearlman reiterated the concurrence of the
Executive Committee of the State Bar Court
with the recommendations of the so-called
"Wiener Committee" which she commissioned to come up with an alternative to the
Board's proposal. The Wiener Committee,
chaired by retired Justice Howard B. Wiener,
found that it would be an intrusion on the
judicial independence of the State Bar Court
for the Bar to approve and select judges
while at the same time overseeing the lead
discipline enforcement personnel, and suggested that (1) the Supreme Court appoint
the members of the special committee, or (2)
utilization of the Bar's existing Judicial
Nominees Commissions as the Supreme
Court's agent for evaluating the proposed
reappointments of sitting SBC judges.
The Discipline Committee, authorized
by the Board to review and respond to the
public comments, made no revision to the
August version of the amendments to Rule
961, and transmitted the additional comments to the Supreme Court on October
13.
In December, the Supreme Court rejected the Bar's formulation and released
its own amendments to Rule 961 for pub-
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lic comment. Under the Court's rule,
which addresses procedures for both the
appointment and reappointment of SBC
judges, the Court itself will create an Applicant Evaluation and Nomination Committee to solicit and evaluate applications
for vacancies on the State Bar Court. The
seven-member Committee is required to
consist of four lawyers, two active or retired judges, and one public member; no
more than two members of the Committee
may be present members of the Board of
Governors, and neither of those may sit on
the Board's Discipline Committee. The
Committee must evaluate the qualifications of all applicants and make recommendations to the Court after considering
a variety of relevant factors (includingfor reappointment purposes-prior service as a State Bar Courtjudge). The Committee must submit the names of at least
three qualified candidates for each vacancy
to the Court; at the same time it transmits its
recommendations to the Court, the Committee must inform any incumbent seeking reappointment if he/she is not among the
candidates recommended for appointment
to the new term.
At this writing, the comment period on
the Supreme Court's version of Rule 961
is scheduled to end on January 13.
"Futures Commission" Circulates Interim Report for Public Comment. On
December20, the Commission on the Future
of the Legal Profession and the State Bar
(also known as the "Futures Commission")
released an interim report featuring a description of some of the Commission's recommendations. The Futures Commission
was created in 1992 by then-Bar President
Harvey Saferstein primarily in response to
AB 687 (W. Brown), a serious legislative
effort to abolish the "integrated" State Bar
(part state agency; part trade association;
mandatory membership) and replace it with
a more traditional occupational licensing
agency within the Department of Consumer
Affairs. Speaker Brown later amended his
bill to create a 21 -member task force to study
alternatives to the current structure of the
Bar, Governor Wilson vetoed it because the
composition of the task force did not include
any gubernatorial appointees and because he
thought a study "broader in scope and representation than that contemplated by this
bill is warranted." [12:4 CRLR 233] The legislative and executive branch interest in restructuring the Bar served as a wake-up call
to the Board of Governors, however, and the
Futures Commission was created. [13:2&3
CRLR 219; 13:1 CRLR 140-41]
Although the original intent behind the
Futures Commission was a study of the
future of the integrated State Bar in regulating the legal profession in California,

the Commission quickly expanded its focus.
In July 1993, the Commission adopted a
mission statement which included (1)
identification and examination of the factors which will significantly influence the
delivery of legal services and the administration of justice over the next quartercentury; (2) development of a vision of the
California legal profession of the future,
which anticipates and effectively meets
societal challenges over the next quartercentury; and (3) recommendations to the
Bar of strategies and structures for meeting the future needs of the public and the
profession and, in light of those future
needs, proposals regarding the best frameworks for the governance of the lawyers
of California. [13:4 CRLR 213-14]
Entitled Summa ry and Highlightsof Key
Recommendations, the Futures Commission's December 20 interim report provides a synopsis of many of the principal
proposals adopted by the Commission.
Recommendations in the key governmental areas of admissions, discipline, and Bar
structure include the following:
- Mandatory Barfor Admissions and
Discipline-A majority of the commissioners felt that admission into the profession and discipline of licensees should be
handled by a mandatory bar. The Commission expressed its opinion that admissions
and discipline are proper obligations of
the profession as a whole, and should be
performed and financially supported by a
mandatory organization composed of all
lawyers in the state.
- Retain Integrated Bar Structure for
All Current Functions-By a 13-8 vote,
the Commission decided to recommend
that the integrated structure of the State
Bar be maintained with its current functions and limitations. The report acknowledged that this recommendation, along
with a competing recommendation to establish a voluntary trade organization for
non-regulatory activities, "sparked an extended debate within the Commission."
According to the report, the proponents of
the mandatory bar structure carried the
day by pointing to "an array of functions
[which are] inherent or important within
the context of a lawyer's professional and
public obligations" and arguing that "the
mandatory bar was best equipped to help
the profession meet those needs." The majority also contended that "the unified
structure still provides the best assurance
that the profession will further the administration of justice." Although the Commission acknowledged that many complaints about the Bar are valid, it contended
that these problems can be readily dealt with
and "the baby shouldn't be thrown out with
the bathwater." Some commissioners also
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expressed concern that a voluntary bar
could easily become dominated by attorneys in large urban areas and inattentive
to the needs of traditionally underrepresented groups, such as rural and solo practitioners, women, and minorities.
The interim report did not include a
synopsis of the public policy rationales of
the dissenting commissioners who voted
to disintegrate the Bar and delegate its
state police powers to a traditional, nontrade association occupational licensing
agency. The report's discussion of the
competing recommendation to establish a
voluntary trade organization for non-regulatory activities focused on the superior
ability of a voluntary trade association to
lobby effectively in the legislature (which
the Bar, as a quasi-governmental agency
precluded from using mandatory dues for
certain lobbying activities by the Keller
decision, lacks), and perceptions that the
current Bar is too large, overly bureaucratic, and insensitive to the needs of its
rank-and-file members. Most Bar critics
agree that the Futures Commission's failure to substantively address the strong
policy reasons for precluding the integrated Bar from administering state police
power regulatory activities in its final report will no doubt encourage further legislative initiatives to abolish the integrated
Bar (see LEGISLATION).
- Bar Exam Educational Requirements-The Commission recommended
that only graduates of ABA- or Californiaapproved law schools should be allowed
to take the California Bar Examination.
- Admissions Reciprocity-The Commission agreed that licensure reciprocity
should be available to active members in
good standing, licensed for at least three
years in another jurisdiction, who meet
California's moral character and ethical
standards, and are from a state which affords reciprocity to California attorneys.
-Mandatory Malpractice Insurance-The Commission agreed that professional liability insurance should be
mandatory for all active members of the
State Bar; if the minimum level of insurance is not maintained, a member would
be suspended from practice. This recommendation finally implements a longtime
suggestion of State Bar Discipline Monitor Robert C. Fellmeth. [11:4 CRLR 21011]
. Transfer State Bar Court to Supreme Court-A majority ofthe Commission also recommended that the State Bar
Court, which is currently part of the State
Bar (see above), should be under the aegis
of the California Supreme Court; such a
transfer "may assist in strengthening the
judicial role in attorney regulation and
17
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thereby increase public confidence in the
system."
- Disciplineas a Function of Judicial
Branch-The Commission agreed that
the Bar's discipline function should continue to be a function of the judicial branch
of government, and that fact should be
publicized to lawyers and members of the
general public (many of whom erroneously believe that the practitioner-controlled State Bar solely controls disciplinary decisions).
- Supreme CourtAppointment of Chief
Trial Counsel-The Commission recommended that the Bar's Chief Trial Counsel, who is the organization's chief prosecutor, be appointed by the California Supreme Court rather than by the elected
Board of Governors.
The interim report also describes several measures which failed in a close vote
or provoked lengthy discussion. These include a proposal to transfer the entire discipline system to the Supreme Court, the
permanent disbarment concept (see below),
limited practice without passage of the
California Bar Exam for corporate counsel licensed in another state, and the creation of a voluntary bar association to
administer the Bar's trade association activities (see above).
The Futures Commission also set forth
a number of recommendations in other
areas, such as administration of justice
resources (including delivery of legal services to the poor, the development of effective forums for resolving legal disputes, and enhancement of public trust in
the justice system), services which the Bar
should provide to and for lawyers (such as
advisory opinions on questions involving
professional ethics, competence education, an orientation program for new admittees, and representation of the profession in the state legislature), and services
to the public and professionalism (including the promotion of alternative dispute
resolution, the augmentation of funding
for legal aid programs, and the encouragement of legal internships for students, pro
bono service by lawyers and law students,
and public education by the legal profession). A significant recommendation in
this area pertains to the creation of a new
category of legal practitioner called legal
technicians (also known as "independent
paralegals") which has long been advocated as a way to ensure access to basic
legal services and the justice system for
low- and middle-income citizens. Here,
the Futures Commission stated that "with
proper safeguards first put in place, the
legal profession should support a broader
range of legal technician services to the
public which will help achieve greater,
76

more meaningful access to the legal system for more Californians." Although a
task force appointed by the Bar itself first
proposed the legal technician concept in
1988 [8:3 CRLR 129-30], the Board of
Governors has recently refused to consider any meaningful formulation of the
legal technician concept. [11:4 CRLR 211;
11:3 CRLR 198; 11:2 CRLR 181]
At this writing, the public comment
period on the Futures Commission's interim report is scheduled to end on February 28; the Commission is scheduled to
meet in March to consider any comments
submitted, and to approve its final report
which will be submitted to the Board of
Governors.
Bar Proposes Trial Publicity Rule.
On September 26, Governor Wilson signed
SB 254 (Kopp) (Chapter 868, Statutes of
1994), which Senator Quentin Kopp authored in direct response to what he calls
"the staggering excesses of lawyers and
witnesses in the O.J. Simpson criminal
case." SB 254 enacted Business and Professions Code section 6103.7, which requires the Bar to formulate a trial publicity
regulation governing out-of-court statements made by attorneys concerning civil
and criminal adjudicative proceedings.
SB 254 further requires the Bar to consider
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct
3.6 in its deliberation, and to submit the
rule to the California Supreme Court by
March 1, 1995. [14:4 CRLR 214]
On October 11, the Bar's Committee
on Admissions and Competence published proposed new Rule of Professional
Conduct 5-120 for a 90-day public comment period. As published, the rule would
prohibit a lawyer who is participating or
has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter from, directly or indirectly, making an out-of-court statement
"that a reasonable person would expect to
be disseminated by means of public communication," if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the statement will
have a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. The proposed rule, which
is applicable to both civil and criminal
cases and both plaintiff and defense counsel, also contains a "safe harbor" provision
which lists several types of extrajudicial
statements which attorneys are permitted
to make. The Discussion section of the
proposed rule notes that "[wihether an
extrajudicial statement violates rule 5-120
depends on many factors, including: (1)
whether the extrajudicial statement presents information clearly inadmissible as
evidence in the matter for the purpose of
proving or disproving a material fact in
issue; (2) whether the extrajudicial state-

ment presents information the member
knows is false, deceptive, or the use of
which would violate Business and Professions Code section 6068(d); (3) whether
the extrajudicial statement violates a lawful 'gag' order to protective order, statute,
rule of court, or special rule of confidentiality); and (4) the timing of the statement."
In releasing the proposed rule, State
Bar President Donald Fischbach noted,
"Limiting pretrial publicity is a most difficult task when trying to balance the right
of free speech and the accused's right to a
fair trial." Fischbach further stated that the
Bar "also may become involved in establishing additional rules which will affect
the ability of the profession to try a case
in the media rather than in the courtroom."
The "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" language in Rule 5-120 is
based on current ABA Model Rule 3.6 and
the U.S. Supreme Court's plurality decision in Gentile v. State BarofNevada, 498
U.S. 1023 (1991) [11:4 CRLR 213-14;
11:3 CRLR 202], in which the Court considered a disciplinary action that had been
imposed on a Nevada lawyer by the Nevada Supreme Court for allegedly improper extrajudicial statements. Nevada's
trial publicity rule contained both the
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard and a safe harbor provision.
Although the Court reversed the state's
disciplinary action because the attorney's
statements appeared permissible under the
state's vague safe harbor provision, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion upheld the "substantial likelihood" test as
constitutional, "for it is designed to protect
the integrity and fairness of a state's judicial system, and it imposes only narrow
and necessary limitations on lawyers'
speech."
Due to the controversial nature of the
proposed rule, the Bar scheduled two public hearings to receive comments-one on
November 29 in San Francisco and another on December 1 in Los Angeles. Out
in force to oppose the rule were representatives of the American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California, California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice, the Freedom of Information Committee of the Society of Professional Journalists, the California Newspaper Publishers Association, and the Los Angeles County and San
Francisco bar associations. Most argued
that the rule is an unnecessary overreaction to a unique high-profile case; the language of the proposed rule provides no
standard or definition of the term "material prejudice"; and the safe harbor provision should be expanded to permit attorneys to make statements in reaction to
recent publicity not initiated by that attor-
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ney or that attorney's client, when the
attorney's statements are "explanatory and
informative." Among the very few who
spoke in favor of the rule was Senator
Kopp, who noted that California is one of
only a handful of states which have declined to adopt ABA Model Rule 3.6. Senator Kopp also noted that the legal profession is held in low esteem by the public,
and the Bar's refusal to responsibly curb
its members' out-of-court statements would
exacerbate that problem. Finally, he emphasized that lawyers are not simply advocates for their clients; they are officers
of the court, and owe a duty to protect the
integrity of judicial proceedings.
The Bar accepted public comments on
proposed Rule 5-120 until January 9; at
this writing, staff is analyzing the comments received and preparing to submit
the issue to the Board's Committee on
Admissions and Competence at its January 20 meeting, and to the Board of Governors at its January 21 meeting.
Statute of Limitations Concerning
Initiation of Disciplinary Action. At its
October 29 meeting, the Discipline Committee voted to release for public comment
its proposal to establish a disciplinary statute of limitations, as recommended by the
DEC (see above); currently, there is no
limit, and AB 1544 (W. Brown), which
would have imposed a one-year statute of
limitations, was vetoed by Governor Wilson in 1993. [13:4 CRLR 217] The proposal would require a revision to the Rules
of Procedure of the State Bar Court.
The proposed amendment would require the Bar to initiate a disciplinary proceeding "based solely on a complainant's
allegation" of a violation of the State Bar
Act or the Rules of Professional Conduct
within five years from the date of the
alleged violation. The limitations period
may be tolled under certain circumstances
set forth in the rule, including continuing
representation of the client/victim by the
respondent attorney, the pendency of civil,
criminal, or administrative proceedings
arising out of substantially the same facts
or circumstances, and the respondent's
wilful concealment of facts constituting
the violation or failure to cooperate with
the investigation of the allegations. The
proposed rule exempts from the five-year
limitations period the authority of the Bar
to initiate a disciplinary proceeding based
on information received from a source
independent of a time-barred complainant.
At this writing, the comment period is
scheduled to close on January 26.
Other State Bar Rulemaking. The
following is a status update on other proposed regulatory amendments which have

been considered by the State Bar in recent
months and described in detail in previous
issues of the Reporter
- PermanentDisbarment.October 21
marked the close of the public comment
period on the Bar's proposed amendment
to Rule 95 1(f), which would provide for
the permanent disbarment of an attorney
from the Bar. Amended Rule 951 (f) would
prohibit an application for readmission or
reinstatement if an attorney has been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, or the attorney has been found culpable of a violation of the State Bar Act
and/or the Rules of Professional Conduct
involving the misappropriation of clients'
funds in an amount which would constitute grand theft under California law. [14:4
CRLR 211-12]
During the comment period, the Bar
received two comments in support of the
proposed amendment, and seven comments
against it. Proponents of the amendment
argued that it would increase the respect
of the public for the Bar and for attorneys,
as the public would be assured that an
attorney who has committed acts of moral
turpitude (such as stealing clients' trust
funds) is never again permitted to practice
law. Opponents argued that the rule would
repudiate the concept of rehabilitation; reduce the motivation for lawyers to make
restitution to their clients or engage in
other rehabilitative activities; create an incentive to resign with charges pending,
seek reinstatement five years later, and
defend the stale charges at that time; and
forever deprive a lawyer of his/her livelihood.
Although the Discipline Committee
was scheduled to discuss the proposed
permanent disbarment rule at its December 9 meeting, consideration of the matter
was postponed until January.
- Rules of Procedure for State Bar
Court Proceedings. At its August 1994
meeting, the Board of Governors adopted
revised Rules of Procedure of the State
Bar of California; the rules were to become effective on January 1, 1995, subject
to a 90-day public comment period ending
on December 1. These revised rules replace the transitional and provisional rules
which were temporarily adopted when the
SBC was created in 1989. [14:4CRLR 21213; 14:2&3 CRLR 226]
During the comment period, the Bar
received four comments. Chief Assistant
General Counsel Robert A. Hawley determined that the comments either (1) sought
technical corrections which do not substantively change the rules, (2) contained
suggestions for further revisions of a substantive nature which have not yet been
considered or were deferred for future

California Regulatory Law Reporter - Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter 1995)

consideration, or (3) were suggestions for
substantive revisions which have been previously considered and rejected. Hawley
recommended that the Discipline Committee adopt the changes in category (1)
above and reject the changes in category
(3). He noted that consideration of the
comments in category (2) would delay the
implementation of the rules beyond January 1, 1995, and recommended that they
be considered as part of a future revisions
process.
At its December 9 meeting, the Discipline Committee adopted the Rules of
Procedure, subject to the changes in category (1) above. They became effective on
January 1.
- Monetary Penalties for Disciplined
Attorneys. At its December 9 meeting, the
Discipline Committee was scheduled to
discuss the comments received on its proposal to adopt Guidelines for the Imposition of Monetary Sanctions in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings pursuant to Business
and Professions Code section 6086.13,
which became effective on January 1,
1994. The Guidelines would establish two
ranges of fines for disciplinary violations
of the State Bar Act and the Rules of
Professional Conduct (RPC)-an upper
range ($2,600-$5,000 per violation) applicable to the most serious statutory or
RPC violations, and a lower range ($100$2,500 per violation) applicable to all
other statutory or RPC violations. Under
the Guidelines, the specific sanction to be
imposed within the applicable range will
be determined by the SBC judge upon
application of specified criteria. Monetary
sanctions will be paid into the Bar's Client
Security Fund, which assists in compensating clients who have been victimized
by the intentional dishonesty of their lawyers. [14:4 CRLR 213; 14:2&3 CRLR 22425; 13:4 CRLR 215] However, the Discipline Committee postponed discussion of
the monetary penalties guidelines until its
March 1995 meeting.
- IOLTA Account Rulemaking to Enhance Funding for Legal Services. In
July, the Bar's Committee on Legal Services published for comment a proposed
change in the Rules Regulating InterestBearing Trust Fund Accounts for the Provision of Legal Services to Indigent Persons, which govern the Bar's Legal Services Trust Fund Program. The proposed
rule would continue to require attorneys to
deposit client trust account funds in regulated financial institutions, but would permit the institution to hold the funds either
in interest-bearing accounts or in certain
high-quality money market funds which
are registered as a mutual fund pursuant to
federal law and comply with Securities
17
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and Exchange Commission regulations
for money market funds. [14:4 CRLR 213;
14:2&3 CRLR 231] The comment period
on the proposed rule change ended on
October 20; at its December meeting, the
Board of Governors approved the amendment.
- Inactive Enrollment for Failure to
Pay Fee Arbitration Awards. At its August 1994 meeting, the Board of Governors adopted new Chapter 20 (Rules 840851) of the Transitional Rules of Procedure on an emergency basis to enable it to
implement its new authority under AB
1272 (Connolly) (Chapter 1262, Statutes
of 1993). That bill added subsection (d) to
Business and Professions Code section
6203; effective January 1, 1994, the new
provision authorizes the Bar to enforce the
awards of its Mandatory Fee Arbitration
Unit by placing the attorney on involuntary inactive status if he/she fails to comply with a binding award. [14:4 CRL? 213;
13:4 CRLR 218] Following its emergency
adoption of the proposed rules, the Bar
published them for public comment until
November 28; thereafter, the rule changes
were approved by the Discipline Committee as part of the new Rules of Procedure
of the State Bar of California (see above)
and became effective on January 1.
- California Legal Corps Rules. At its
July 1994 meeting, the Board of Governors approved proposed rules to govern
the California Legal Corps (CLC), a multifaceted umbrella organization whose
purposes are to enhance access to the legal
system, encourage attorneys to provide
legal services to those in need, and provide
funding and support for projects that employ unique and creative ways to achieve
these goals. The rules provide for the creation of a Legal Corps Commission to
administer the rules and all provisions of
law regarding the CLC and allocate CLC
funds. [14:4 CRLR 213-14; 14:2&3 CRLR
225-26; 13:2&3 CRL? 218-19]These rules
must be approved by the California Supreme Court before they become effective; at this writing, staff has yet to forward
the rules to the court.
* Gifts to Attorneys From Clients. On
October 19, the Bar forwarded its proposed amendments to Rule of Professional
Conduct 4-400, regarding gifts to attorneys
from their clients, to the California Supreme
Court for approval. As amended, the rule
reads as follows: "[A State Bar] member
shall not: (A) induce a client to make any
gift, including a testamentary gift, to the
member or to a person whom the member
knows is related to the member; or (B) prepare an instrument which provides for any
gift from a client, including a testamentary
gift, to the member or to a person whom the
.78

member knows is related to the member,
except where the client is related to the
member or transferee." [14:2&3CRLR 22627; 14:1 CRLR 176; 13:4 CRLR 217] At this
writing, the Supreme Court has not acted
on the proposal.
-Employment of Disbarred, Suspended, Resigned, or Involuntarily Inactive Lawyers. On September 30, the public
comment period closed on the proposal of
the Bar's Discipline Committee and its
Committee on Admissions and Competence to adopt a revised version of Rule
1-311, regarding the employment of disbarred, suspended, and inactive lawyers.
[14:4 CRIB 214; 14:2&3 CRLR 227; 14:1
CRLR 1761
As published by the committees, Rule
1-311 would prohibit a State Bar member
from employing, associating professionally with, or aiding a person the member
knows or reasonably should know is a
disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member to perform the
following on behalf of the member's client: (I) render legal consultation or advice
to the client; (2) appear on behalf of the
client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, commissioner, or hearing officer; (3)
appear as a representative of the client at
a deposition or other discovery matter; (4)
negotiate or transact any matter for or on
behalf of the client with third parties; (5)
receive, disburse, or otherwise handle the
client's funds; or (6) otherwise engage in
activities which constitute the practice of
law. The revised rule would require a
member to provide specified notice to affected clients and to the State Bar prior to
employment of such a person, and to the
State Bar following termination of the employment of such a person.
During the comment period, the Bar
received 19 comments, of which only five
supported the proposal. Those in opposition raised the following points: (1) the
proposed rule is unnecessary because its
provisions are contained in existing sections of the Business and Professions
Code and the Rules of Professional Conduct; (2) the rule would restrict "tainted"
attorneys from engaging in certain activities which non-attorneys are free to perform; and (3) the rule would make it almost impossible for a "tainted" attorney to
find employment in a law firm setting.
At its October 28 meeting, the Committee on Admissions and Competence
discussed the comments received and
other policy considerations raised by the
proposed rule. The Committee determined
that the major concern is the scope of the
rule's prohibited activities in that they ar-

guably include activities which a non-attorney may perform (thereby expanding
the definition ofthe practice of law). Other
problematic areas identified were the inability of the Bar to discipline the disbarred, because they are outside the Bar's
jurisdiction; and the notice requirement to
clients where the services to be performed
do not involve legal services, which was
generally perceived to discourage potential employers from hiring disciplined attorneys and create constitutional challenges.
Admissions Committee members agreed
that the Bar should receive notice of the
employment and that some notice should
be provided to clients, but they disagreed
on the implementation of the rule. Unable
to resolve the issues, the Admissions Committee decided to refer the rule back to the
Discipline Committee.
At its December 9 meeting, the Discipline Committee entertained a slightly
revised version of the proposal, which
would require a Bar member who hires a
disciplined lawyer to "serve.. .written notice upon each client on whose specific
matter such person will work, prior to or
at the time of employing such person to
work on the client's specific matter."
However, the Discipline Committee also
postponed consideration of the rule, and
directed staff to research several issues,
including the number of occurrences of
this type of incident and other ways of
addressing these concerns.
- Copies of Significant Documents
for Clients. In September 1993, the Board
of Governors forwarded proposed new
Rule of Professional Conduct 3-520, which
would require attorneys to provide to a
client, upon request, one copy of any significant document or correspondence received or prepared by the attorney relating
to the employment or representation, to
the California Supreme Court for review
and approval. [14:1 CRLR 176; 13:1 CRLR
142]
In May 1994, the Supreme Court returned the proposed rule to the Bar, with
instructions to release it for comments
from California superior and appellate
courts, particularly with regard to the potential fiscal impact of the proposed rule
on appellate courts in criminal cases in
which counsel has been appointed by the
court for indigent defendants. According
to the Court, "[r]ecords and transcripts on
appeal may consist of tens of thousands of
pages. Such material arguably would be
'significant' to any appeal and it would
appear that the cost of complying with the
proposed rule, which would be passed on
to the courts, could be considerable." The
Court suggested that the Bar may wish, for
example, to determine whether a defini-
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tion of the term "significant" or some
other means may be used to describe more
precisely "an attorney's duty in the criminal appellate context or even in other instances in which an onerous fiscal burden
may be placed on courts or counsel." Additionally, the Court suggested that the Bar
contemplate including language in the
rule to state that the rule does not supersede any other statutory orjudicially-created protective orders or other nondisclosure agreements.
Accordingly, the Bar released the proposal for public comment in August, and
closed the public comment period on November 21. At this writing, staff is analyzing the comments received and formulating a recommendation to the Bar.

U

LEGISLATION
SB 60 (Kopp), as introduced January
3, would implement the findings of the
DEC report (see above) by limiting the
total amount of annual Bar licensing fees
to $378 ($100 less than the Bar's current
fee of $478 per year), with correspondingly lower fees imposed on attorneys admitted for less than three years. It would
also require the Bar to conduct a plebescite
of its members to determine whether they
favor changing the State Bar from a mandatory to a voluntary association, and report the results to the legislature by March
1, 1996. [S. Jud]

*

LITIGATION

In Brosterhous, et al. v. State Bar of
California,29 Cal. App. 4th 963 (Oct. 27,
1994), the Third District Court of Appeal
dealt a serious blow to the Bar's desire to
limit challenges to its calculation of the
expenditures which may be charged to Bar
members in the form of annual dues. Although the trial court upheld the Bar's
procedures which establish binding arbitration as the method of challenging the
propriety of the Bar's dues calculations,
the Third District reversed and ruled that
the Bar's binding arbitration procedure
does not preclude adjudication of alleged
violations of the challengers' first amendment rights in a judicial forum.
This dispute has its roots in Keller v.
State Barof California,496 U.S. 1 (1990)
[10:2&3CRLR 215-16], in which the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down the Bar's use
of compelled membership dues for ideological or political purposes unrelated to
the Bar's primary purposes of "regulating
the legal profession [or] improving the
quality of legal services." The Court also
required the Bar to adopt adequate procedures, such as those outlined in Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986), to protect the interests of objec-

tors. In response to Keller,the Bar adopted
Article IA, procedures under which it is
required to analyze and categorize its expenditures as "chargeable" or "non-chargeable," and offer all Bar members an opportunity to decline to pay the "non-chargeable" portion (the so-called "Hudson deduction"). Under Article IA, challengers
may dispute the Bar's calculation of the
"chargeable" portion, after which the Bar
must place the disputed amount in escrow;
if the Bar refuses to amend its calculations, the matter is submitted to binding
arbitration, "subject to such appropriate
review as determined by the Supreme Court."
For the 1991 dues year, the Bar computed the "non-chargeable" portion of its
expenditures as amounting to $3 per member. Plaintiffs paid their Bar dues under
protest and challenged the calculation, contending that the actual "non-chargeable"
amount was $87 per attorney. All objectors
then participated in a single, consolidated
hearing before an arbitrator who ordered the
Bar to refund an additional $4.36 per challenger. [12:2&3 CRLR 270] Instead of
seeking direct review of the arbitration
award, plaintiffs commenced this action in
superior court, alleging violation of their
rights to freedom of speech and association, 42 U.S.C. section 1983, and Article
1, sections 2-3 of the California Constitution. [12:4 CRLR 237] The Bar demurred,
claiming that the action is barred by the
binding effect of the arbitrator's decision
as provided in the Bar's procedures; the
superior court sustained the demurrer in
January 1993. [13:2&3 CRLR 223-24]
On appeal, the Third District decided
that the issue is "whether Article IA, assuming it was lawfully adopted, establishes the exclusive remedy for adjudication of a Keller challenge to State Bar
expenditures." Citing a long line of U.S.
Supreme Court cases holding that a binding arbitration procedure does not preclude an independent judicial action alleging violation of statutory rights, the Third
District held that the Bar may not confine
the challengers' section 1983 claims to arbitration; "Congress intended such claim to be
judicially enforced." To emphasize its
point, the court cited several cases (including Hudson) in which an arbitration process had been developed precisely to decide first amendment claims; according to
the Third District, "even an arbitration
scheme devised specifically to adjudicate
First Amendment claims, as in Hudson....
will not preclude an independent section
1983 judicial action."
In sum, the court held that "the procedures outlined in Hudson and applied to
the State Bar in Keller were never intended to be a final adjudication of First
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Amendment rights of objecting members.
Rather, they provide interim relief designed to counterbalance the power of a
labor union or integrated bar association
to exact fees without first establishing that
such fees will be used for legitimate organizational purposes." The Bar has filed
a petition seeking review by the California
Supreme Court of the Third District's decision.
On December 28, a 4-3 majority of the
California Supreme Court reversed the
First District Court of Appeal's decision in
Flatt v. Superior Court (Daniel, Real
Party in Interest), 9 Cal. 4th 275. In this
case, William Daniel approached attorney
Gail Flatt and asked her to handle a possible legal malpractice action against Donald Hinkle, Daniel's former attorney. Less
than one week later, Flatt advised Daniel
she could not represent him because her
firm had a conflict (it represented Hinkle
in an unrelated action). Two years later,
Daniel sued both Hinkle and Flatt for legal
malpractice-his claim against Flatt was
that she failed to warn him of the applicable statute of limitations governing his
claims against Hinkle. Following discovery, Flatt moved for summary judgment on
grounds she owed no duty to Daniel because
no attorney-client relationship had ever been
established. The trial court declined to grant
Flatt's motion, on grounds there were triable issues of fact material to whether an
attorney-client relationship had arisen between Flatt and Daniel. Flatt appealed; the
First District affirmed. [14:2&3 CRLR 22930]
Writing for the majority, Justice Armand Arabian disagreed with the lower
courts' assumption that the question of
Daniel's client status is material to the
dispositive issue raised by Flatt's motion
for summary judgment. Acknowledging
that neither the parties' research nor its
own had uncovered case authority squarely
on point, the majority held that an attorney's
duty of undivided loyalty to an existing
client negates any duty on the part of the
attorney to inform a prospective client of
the statute of limitations applicable to a
proposed lawsuit or even of the advisability of seeking alternative counsel. The majority warned that its holding is narrow
and confined to the facts of this case, in
which the attorney is confronted "with a
mandatory and unwaivable duty not to
represent the second client in light of an
irremediable conflict with the existing client and acts promptly to terminate the
relationship after learning of the conflict.
We caution the bar that, in the absence of
such an irreducible conflict and mandatory duty to withdraw, and attorney's duty
to advise a new or even a 'prospective'
17,
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client, once the nonengagement decision
has been taken, may well be more extensive...."
Justice Joyce Kennard authored a sharp
dissent which found fault with the majority's
entire approach. She noted that the majority
failed to clearly address the two distinct
issues presented in the case: whether Flatt
owed a duty of care to Daniel, and-if sowhether that duty obligated herto advise him
about the statute of limitations when she
terminated her representation of him. In Justice Kennard's view, "once one assumes, as
does the majority, that Daniel was Flatt's
client, the conclusion is inescapable that
Flatt owed a duty of care to Daniel." If that
is true, then Flatt owed the same duty of care
to Daniel as she did to Hinkle. "Instead, the
majority myopically focuses solely on
Flatt's duty to Hinkle, and holds that her duty
of loyalty to Hinkle 'absolved her of a duty
to provide any advice to Daniel adverse to
the interests of Hinkle."' Justice Kennard
concluded that "the effect of the majority's
decision is to create two classes of clients,
and to hold that the duties owed to the firstengaged client (here, Hinkle) not only can
negate the duties owed to the second-engaged client (here, Daniel) but can also immunize the lawyer from liability for injuring
the second-engaged client to advance the
interests of the first-engaged client. This result is unprecedented in the law...I cannot
agree with the majority...that the reason
Daniel should lose is that he belongs to a new
species of client to whom lawyers owe no
duty."
In ITT Small Business Finance Corporation v. Niles, 9 Cal. 4th 245 (Dec. 28,
1994), the California Supreme Court affirmed the Second District Court of
Appeal's holding which interprets Code of
Civil Procedure section 340.6 regarding
the one-year statute of limitations on legal
malpractice actions. Section 340.6 provides that legal malpractice actions commence running when the client discovers
or should have discovered the facts constituting the malpractice; however, the
statute is tolled during the time the client
"has not sustained any injury." In this case
involving a challenge to the adequacy of
loan documents prepared by an attorney,
the Second District and the Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations in
a transactional legal malpractice action
commences upon the entry of adverse
judgment, settlement, or dismissal of the
underlying action. [14:2&3 CRLR 230]
The court again noted that its holding is
narrow, and is limited to transactional
legal malpractice cases where the adequacy of documentation is the subject of
the dispute.
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FUTURE MEETINGS

January 20-21 in San Francisco.
March 10-11 in San Francisco.
April 7-8 in Los Angeles.
May 19-20 in San Francisco.
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